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COMMENTS ON GOVERNMENT CENSORSHIP
AND SECRECY
Larry M. Elison*
Deborah E. Elison**
I. INTRODUCTION
The original identifiable principles of the United States Con-
stitution were several. What they were and what they now are is
the subject of unending debate. One principle, the principle of lim-
ited government, is not questioned. Spokespersons of the most di-
verse schools of constitutional jurisprudence would agree that the
federal government is no longer a government of limited, dele-
gated, and enumerated power.1 Today the federal government has
exclusive and unlimited power in foreign affairs2 and plenary and
unlimited power in domestic affairs. An expansive interpretation of
the interstate commerce clause coupled with the power to tax and
spend have obliterated the principle of a limited government.
With the elimination of the principle of a limited federal gov-
ernment, an admitted central tenet of the founder's original intent,
it is difficult to comprehend the attachment of some constitutional
scholars and some current members of the United States Supreme
Court to "original intent jurisprudence" and their demand for spe-
cific detailed language to support expanding concepts of individual
liberty.3 To eliminate, by expansive interpretation and judicial def-
erence, the principle of limited government and contemporane-
ously insist upon a narrow and detailed construction of individual
liberties accentuates a growing disequilibrium. A comparison of the
expansive interpretations in such cases as Wickard v. Filburn4 (ag-
* Professor, University of Montana School of Law. Portions of this article were adapted
from Professor Elison's address, "Free Speech and Government Control of Information,"
presented at an international symposium sponsored by Toyo University and the University
of Montana, April 29, 1993.
** Former student in Joint Program in Law and Public Administration at University of
Montana. Portions of this article stem from Mrs. Elison's MPA degree professional paper
entitled "Right to Know Provision of the Constitution of the State of Montana: Ethical and
Legal Guidelines for the Public Administrator" (1983) (located in the Mansfield Library,
University of Montana).
1. The breach of the principle of limited government commenced no later than Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), with Justice Marshall's reading of the
Necessary and Proper Clause.
2. This unlimited executive power may even allow the President to modify individual
constitutional rights to accomplish international objectives. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (modifying the right of access to courts of law).
3. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION ch. 5 (1993).
4. 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that the Interstate Commerce Clause of Article I, Sec-
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ricultural control), Perez v. United States' (criminal law control),
and Katzenbach v. McClung6 (discrimination control) with the
narrow rigidity of the opinions in Bowers v. Hardwick7 (sexual ori-
entation), Employment Division, Department of Human Re-
sources v. Smith' (religious freedom and drugs), and Harmelin v.
Michigan9 (cruel and unusual punishment and sentencing propor-
tionality) highlights the disequilibrium. 10
Acknowledging that constitutional interpretations eliminated
all presumptions against the power of government, the only re-
maining limitations against plenary government power are specific
constitutional prohibitions designed to protect individual liberty.
The following discussion is in support of the broadest possible in-
terpretation of individual liberty. The focus of the discussion is on
the freedoms to know and to speak and against the power of gov-
ernment to censor and conceal. Beyond that general proposition,
the authors attempt to evaluate the Montana Constitution's right
to know provision" and its case interpretations. The right to
know would seem to be an example of a right too obvious to deny,
tion 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution empowered Congress to enact the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act of 1938, controlling home consumption of home-grown wheat).
5. 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (holding that the Interstate Commerce Clause, Article I, Sec-
tion 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution, empowered Congress to enact the Consumer Credit
Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 891 et seq., making small, local intrastate loan-sharking activ-
ities subject to federal criminal law).
6. 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (holding that the Interstate Commerce Clause, Article I, Sec-
tion 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution, empowered Congress to enact the Civil Rights Act of
1964 prohibiting racial discrimination in a restaurant not frequented by interstate
travelers).
7. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the constitutional right of privacy did not pro-
tect homosexual sodomy between consenting adults in private from the reach of state crimi-
nal law).
8. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment did not exempt the sacramental use of peyote by members of the Native American
Church from state criminal law).
9. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (holding that conviction of cocaine possession and sentenc-
ing to mandatory life imprisonment were not cruel and unusual punishment within the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment, and that the trial court's failure to consider mitigating
factors was inconsequential). According to the Court, severe, mandatory penalties may be
cruel, but they are not unusual. Further, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment con-
tains no proportionality guarantee. Id. at 2686.
10. The problem is complicated by the demise of federalism as a principle of import in
judicial decisions. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). An
appeal to the federal judiciary to broadly interpret the Bill of Rights or to give meaning to
the Ninth Amendment for the protection of unspecified individual rights, such as the right
to know, as against government infringement, could be viewed as an appeal for increasingly
intrusive federal government action rather than a balancing of the scales between govern-
ment powers and individual liberties.
11. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9.
12. See infra notes 89-147 and accompanying text.
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like the rights of travel' s and association,14 although none of these
rights are specifically mentioned in the United States Constitution.
The Montana Constitution provides for a right to know but fails to
mention either the right to travel or the right of association.
In large measure the right to know is a corollary of the free-
dom of speech, particularly of political speech. To participate ef-
fectively and knowledgeably in the political process of a democracy
one must be permitted the fullest imaginable freedom of speech
and one must be fully apprised of what government is doing, has
done, and is proposing to do. The United States Constitution ex-
plicitly protects freedom of speech,1 5 but provides no explicit pro-
tection for the right to know.
II. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW IN THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION
A. History
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or the press ... " No significant constitutional history
amplifies what the members of the Constitutional Convention of
1776 intended with the language they chose to protect the free-
doms of speech and press. At the time the First Amendment was
ratified in 1791 and later in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified, many states had laws inhibiting the freedoms of
speech and press, including laws against defamation, misrepresen-
tation, perjury, obscenity, false advertising, solicitation of crime,
conspiracy, criminal syndicalism, and sedition. Insufficient evi-
dence exists to conclude unequivocally what the framers had in
mind or whether they even knew what they had in mind. " "[T]he
only reliable evidence of what 'the ratifiers' thought they were rati-
fying is the language of the provision they approved."' s
Whatever the founding fathers meant, freedom of speech and
freedom of the press in the abstract have become highly regarded
and stand as preferred rights today. However, freedom of expres-
sion is not so vigorously supported when the message is personally
abhorrent as in obscenity directed against women, hate speech di-
rected against racial and religious minorities, or radical political
positions directed against paranoid governments.
13. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
14. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 209 (1988).
18. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 17 (1980).
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The Sedition Act of 179819 is an example of governmental in-
tolerance of political speech. The Act, which in retrospect seems
abominable, represented an eighteenth century libertarian posi-
tion.10 The Act made it a crime to write, print, utter, or publish
any false, scandalous, or malicious writing against the government
of the United States, either house of Congress, or the President
with intent to defame or to bring them into contempt or disre-
pute. 1 In accordance with English common law, the Act imposed
no prior restraints on expression but provided subsequent punish-
ment for the seditious libel.22 The Act required proof of criminal
intent, allowed truth as a defense, and gave the jury the power to
determine both fact and law.23 This procedural design moved be-
yond the English common law to comport with eighteenth century
libertarianism in the United States. Nonetheless, the Act was a
powerful tool of repression. 2' Enforcement of the Act was not sub-
tle, targeting the opposing political party and the press that sup-
ported it.2 5
Judicial development of free speech and freedom of the press
was largely delayed, perhaps fortunately so. Many free speech
cases reached the courts during the first 125 years following ratifi-
cation of the First Amendment; however:
The overwhelming weight of judicial opinion in all jurisdictions
offered little recognition and even less protection of free speech
interests .... A general hostility to the value of free expression
permeated the judicial system. This pervasive hostility had few
doctrinal underpinnings, nor was it openly expressed. Judges
often emphasized the sanctity of free speech in the very process
of reaching adverse decisions in concrete cases.2"
In the past 75 years, a multitude of cases and accompanying schol-
arly opinions have poured forth. During that period the primary
19. Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596-97 (expired 1801).
20. LEVY, supra note 17, at 249-60.
21. LEVY, supra note 17, at 249-60.
22. The English position permitted a person to be jailed or perhaps executed for sedi-
tious libel as long as the person was not restrained from speaking or writing in the first
instance. LEVY, supra note 17, at 215.
23. LEVY, supra note 17, at 259.
24. While no case came before the United States Supreme Court, 15 indictments were
handed down, 10 convictions were obtained, three prestigious editors were convicted, and
three newspapers were forced to discontinue publication. See David A. Anderson, The Ori-
gins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 515 n.343 (1983) (citing J. SMITH, FREEDOM'S
FETTERS 176-87 (1956)).
25. Id. at 515.
26. David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514,
557 (1981).
[Vol. 55
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focus has been on subversive speech, 7 defamatory speech, 28 ob-
scene speech,29 and offensive speech.30 Limitations on freedom of
expression continue to be important concerns; however, another
villain of monstrous proportions lurks in the wings. That villain is
government control of information and official secrecy.
Secrecy in government is ancient, traditional, venerated, and
insidious.3 In England, parliamentary debates were originally
closed to the public on the theory that secrecy protected against
interference by the Crown and later debates were closed to conceal
the members' statements and votes from constituents.3 2 Although
27. Subversive speech cases have reviewed criminal syndicalism, union activity, and
communism. The early language relied on the "bad tendency" test leaving unions, left-wing
activists, and theoretical Marxists at high risk. The current test is much more sensitive to
the importance of a free press and asks whether the speech is a purposeful incitement to
imminent lawless action against the established government and likely to produce such law-
less action. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969).
28. Defamatory speech has run the gamut from the Sedition Act of 1798 to New York
Times v. Sullivan, which provided open season on government and agents of government.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Prosecution for criminal defamation is
almost non-existent today, and civil defamation is based on state law as modified by United
States Supreme Court interpretations. Currently, for public officials to recover damages for
defamation, there must be a showing of reckless disregard or knowing falsity proved by clear
and convincing evidence. Id. at 285.
29. Prohibiting obscene speech has been a governmental concern predating the Consti-
tution. The current legal test is long, obtuse, and satisfies no one. The general outline de-
scribed in Miller v. California, as amplified in a number of subsequent cases, is still the law.
The Miller test asks:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest (cita-
tion omitted); . . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offen-
sive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
Miller, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
30. Offensive speech is an increasing concern and is often caught between inept pro-
posals to regulate conduct and the stigma of politically correct speech. Constitutionally ac-
ceptable prohibitions include speech directed toward a specific person intended to incite to
violence, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). See generally Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), and speech that creates a "hostile environment" in the
work place, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Intentional intimidation
endangering civil or human rights is an area currently under intense debate without a final
definitive answer, but note statutes such as 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8309 (Supp. 1993),
and CAL. CIV. CODE § 52(b) (West Supp. 1993). See also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.
Ct. 2538 (1992).
31. Secrecy and intrigue are associated with monarchies, kings, and empresses, from
Cleopatra to the Ayatollah Khomeni and from the Inquisition to the Shah of Iran. Recall
the agencies of secrecy that have carried out intrigue from the Shah's SAVAK and the So-
viet KGB to the secret death squads in Central America. The most notable evil chamber in
our own common-law history (the well-known Star Chamber) charged, convicted, tortured,
and killed in secrecy.
32. HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW 180 (1953).
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common law recognized a limited right of the public to inspect
government-held documents, the right to observe deliberations of
governmental bodies did not exist. Further, publication of the pro-
ceedings of governmental bodies was prohibited.3
The founding fathers, mostly aristocrats, schooled in the his-
tory of secrecy and somewhat fearful of the commoner, responded
with secrecy. In 1776, the names of the signers of the Declaration
of Independence were withheld for six months,s4 and both the
Continental Congress and the Constitutional Convention excluded
the public from all deliberations.3 5
The framers of the Constitution apparently failed to recognize
the existence of any public right to access government information,
although the historical position is in dispute.3 Thomas Jefferson
cautioned against the secrecy of the Constitutional Convention in a
letter to John Adams, written during the summer of 1787: "I am
sorry they began their deliberations by so abominable a precedent
as that of tying up the tongues of their members. Nothing can jus-
tify this example but the innocence of their intentions, and igno-
rance of the value of public discussions. ''37
Both classical and contemporary theories of democracy not
only require freedom of access to information, but also justify, as
an inherent public right, demands for information about what gov-
ernment is doing and under what circumstances.3 8 "Secrecy in gov-
ernment menaces democracy and sets a pattern that follows the
political philosophy of a totalitarian state."39 Public knowledge of
government is essential to the democratic process.
James Madison said, "A popular [g]overnment without popu-
lar information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a [p]rologue to
a [f]arce or a [t]ragedy; or, perhaps both."4 " If people are to judge
the operation of government, they must have the facts about gov-
33. FRANK THAYER, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE PRESS §§ 10, 29 (1962).
34. Id. § 10. The secrecy was rationalized as a reasonable response to possible prose-
cution for treason.
35. This was continued in the House of Representatives until 1794 and in the Senate
until 1812. Present-day rules of both houses of Congress continue to allow for proceedings to
be held in secret. Id.
36. See Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., Constitutional Law: The People's Right to Know,
45 A.B.A. J. 667, 668 (1959); Louis Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold:
The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 273 (1971).
37. David M. O'Brien, The First Amendment and the Public's "Right to Know," 7
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 579, 592 (1980) (quoting from 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
69 (J. Boyd ed., 1955)).
38. Id.
39. THAYER, supra note 33, § 29.
40. 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
180 [Vol. 55
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ernment. The information must be complete and undistorted to
make informed debate possible41 and to make the election process
effective. Voters must have full information as to the character of
their agents, the actions taken by their agents, and the actions
their agents intend to take.
The legitimacy of democratic governance depends on the wis-
dom of the voters, which can only be advanced by allowing each
citizen to discover "truth" by full disclosure of all available infor-
mation.42 No governmental body is so infallible as to permit the
substitution of its judgment for that of each individual person in
the determination of issues of truth or falsity.43 Evidence bearing
on public decisions must be available to the community without
any intervening "preselection" by the state. Restrictions under-
mine the search for truth and distort the process by which citizens
make decisions. The goal is not just the search for political truth,
but the search for all forms of "truth." The denial of information
at its source disarranges the functioning of our political institu-
tions and processes, and the distribution of power.4 4 A fully in-
formed citizenry maximizes the likelihood that sound decisions will
be reached.
The question remains: Does a constitutional right to access
government information exist? The language of the United States
Constitution does not include an explicit provision creating a pub-
lic right to access government information, although certain consti-
tutional provisions do imply such a right of access, including the
First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of the
press. The Supreme Court has suggested that the First Amend-
ment may contain narrow aspects of a right to know, stating that
"a major purpose of [the First] Amendment [is] to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs."4 The Supreme Court has rec-
ognized a constitutional right to gather information as a corollary
of the rights of freedom of speech and press.46 However, these sug-
gestions have not matured into any formal Court commitment to a
constitutional right to know.
One simple conclusion would seem to follow inevitably from
41. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-4, at 813-14 (2d ed.
1987).
42. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25
(1948).
43. MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1.01 (1984).
44. Wallace Parks, The Open Government Principle: Applying the Right to Know
Under the Constitution, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1957).
45. Mill v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
46. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
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the proposition that "We the People" are in control, that "We the
People" are the rulers. "We the People" must be fully informed
about our government and our government agents. In 1820,
Thomas Jefferson, in a moment of truth and arrogance, said, "I
know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society
but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened
enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the
remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their
discretion."4 7
The exercise of presidential as well as legislative power is lim-
ited by the liberty concept of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The Due Process Clause directly
embodies the fundamental idea that government may not exercise
coercive power over individuals in an arbitrary, capricious, or un-
reasonable manner. Secret government is by definition arbitrary.4 8
All branches of the federal government and all agencies of govern-
ment should be required to justify every exercise of power, and the
courts should continuously posit a presumption against the exer-
cise of government power. The inalienable right to know, to be in-
formed, is possessed by a sovereign people in a democratic govern-
ment as contrasted with a police state in which people are treated
like pawns in a chess game or like blips on a computer screen. Yet
the right to access government information has not been
recognized.
B. How Important Is Government Information?
Government has become the principal collector of information
and perhaps the principal generator of information. Modern com-
munication technology and government access to nearly every facet
of corporate and private life guarantee a maximum accumulation
of information in the hands of government. Government generates
and accumulates information with taxpayer dollars and presump-
tively for the benefit of the citizenry. Agencies and officials of gov-
ernment hold essential knowledge that can thwart the democratic
process if kept secret. Many public administrators as well as
elected officials assume the public is not qualified to make the best
decisions and take it upon themselves to control information,
thereby controlling decisions. Given the hundreds of departments,
47. O'Brien, supra note 37, at 587 n.45 (quoting a letter from Thomas Jefferson to
William C. Jarvis).
48. See Mary M. Cheh, Judicial Supervision of Executive Secrecy: Rethinking Free-
dom of Expression for Government Employees and the Public Right of Access to Govern-
ment Information, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 690 (1984).
[Vol. 55
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branches, and agencies that are managed and staffed by unelected
government employees, often unresponsive to the people, an infor-
mation policy of full disclosure becomes ever more essential.
Hundreds of thousands of government agents with computers
acquire, retrieve, manipulate, and disseminate immense quantities
of information.49 Distribution of information is often by selective
leaks, intentional misinformation ("plausible deniability"), and
disinformation. Government acts are undertaken in the name of
the people of the United States without their consent or even their
knowledge. 50 Many of the actions are highly secret, morally dubi-
ous, and sometimes disastrous.51 The government rarely ever fully
informs the public but conveniently packages selected material to
be released through the media. With such packages of information
the citizenry cannot accurately evaluate the actions of government
officials. Without full disclosure, self-governance becomes a farce.
Once legitimized, secrecy tends to spread as government offi-
cials succumb to strong personal incentives for withholding infor-
mation from the public. Secrecy not only affords an opportunity to
cover up mistakes or to conceal misbehavior, it allows officials to
shape policy as they choose without consulting or informing the
public. Most significantly, secrecy allows officials to escape ac-
countability for their actions. Secrecy threatens the rationality of
government decisions. Some of those excluded from the delibera-
tive process by secretive practices may have information or advice
that could save policy makers from grievous errors in judgment.
Open government should be the general rule with few exceptions.
The struggle between open government and the paranoia of
government secrecy culminated in the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA).2 Congress passed the FOIA to ensure an informed citi-
zenry, to serve as a check against corruption, and to hold those
who govern accountable to the governed. The FOIA succeeded in
none of these laudable goals. The basic difficulty with the FOIA is
that Congress purported to pass a freedom of information act but
49. For example, the National Security Agency alone is free, under the law, to "target,
record, transcribe, and disseminate" all telecommunications of U.S. citizens abroad and
"every telephone call and message entering, leaving, or transiting the country as long as it is
done by microwave interception." JAMES BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE 372 (1982); see also
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1988).
50. Examples include: the Bay of Pigs; the bombing of neutral Cambodia; the assassi-
nation of Chile's democratically elected president; military activities in Guatemala, Viet-
nam, Grenada, Nicaragua, and El Salvador; and the Watergate and Iran-Contra fiascoes.
The list seems unending.
51. See examples supra at note 50.
52. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (current ver-
sion at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988)).
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succeeded in passing what Judge Gordon Bennett"3 has so astutely
labelled the "Official Secrecy in Government Act."' " The FOIA is
really a statement of what the government may keep secret. Some
government information warrants a measure of confidentiality; for
example, a private individual's medical or personnel records.5
However, the FOIA exemptions swallow the law. 6
53. Judge Gordon Bennett is a retired state district court judge living in Helena, Mon-
tana, who continues to be a tireless and vigorous advocate of openness in government.
54. The following nine categories of documents comprise the exemptions of the FOIA:
(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to
be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in
fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of
this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld
from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B)
establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular type of mat-
ters to be withheld;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person
and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would con-
stitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A)
could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B)
would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C)
could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential
source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private insti-
tution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a
record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the
course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national
security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source,
(E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations
or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or
prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention
of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical
safety of any individual;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports pre-
pared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or
supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning
wells.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1988).
55. An individual's right of privacy should not be confused with the government's
power to conceal.
56. Two of the exemptions are extraordinarily broad. Exemption 1 exempts material
in the interest of national security and by executive order. There seems to be no substantive
limit on the executive order. Exemption 3 exempts anything that is specifically exempted
from disclosure by other statutes. Again, there seems to be no substantive limit on what
other statutes might exempt. See supra note 54.
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Government seems to give citizens the "right to know" only
when it is convenient for government. Where is the source of gov-
ernment power to maintain secrecy? Have "We the People"
granted that power to our agents of government? Our revolution-
ary forefathers had a vision of limited government possessed only
of enumerated and delegated powers. The people were to control
the government. The people were not to be subservient to the gov-
ernment. Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has given char-
acter to that vision. Rather, the Supreme Court has announced
that "neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amend-
ment mandates a right of access to government information or
sources of information within the government's control."5 The
principle of a right to know seems implicitly a part of First
Amendment free speech.
As a necessity of representational democracy, the right to
know should be derived from the Ninth Amendment: "The enu-
meration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people." '58 As
the law now stands, no federal constitutional right to know exists.
The Court has not derived the right to know from the Ninth
Amendment; nor has the Court found that the right to know ema-
nates from the penumbras of the Bill of Rights; nor has the Court
determined that the right to know is an essential part of the core
principle of representational democracy. The Court simply denies
that the right exists. Congress has demeaned, diminished, and ridi-
culed the ideal of a right to know by codifying government conceal-
ment in nine separate categories of the FOIA, including such amor-
phous and broad ranging classifications as executive orders
authorizing concealment in the interest of national defense or for-
eign policy and concealment specifically provided by statute. 9
C. Some Examples-U.S. Supreme Court Cases
Some examples of judicial application and interpretation of
the FOIA furnish stark illustrations of how the FOIA protects fed-
eral government secrecy. In Environmental Protection Agency v.
Mink, members of Congress sought to compel disclosure of classi-
fied documents concerning a scheduled underground nuclear test."0
The United States Supreme Court held that the FOIA does not
permit compelled disclosure of the classified documents, in-camera
57. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
59. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A), (b)(3) (1988).
60. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
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inspection to sift out non-secret components, nor in-camera inspec-
tions to determine the legitimacy of the classification. The Su-
preme Court further noted that the FOIA does not require that
confidential documents be made available for a district court's in-
camera inspection regardless of how little, if any, purely factual
material they contain. The FOIA does not compel disclosure of
classified documents. In interpreting the FOIA, no means exist to
question an executive decision to stamp a document secret whether
done cynically, myopically, or corruptly. The law requires blind ac-
ceptance of executive fiat. Justice Douglas noted in the Mink dis-
sent that the President could "make even the time of day 'Top
Secret.' ,
Court theories of standing further restrict ordinary citizens
from accessing government information. The Supreme Court in
United States v. Richardson2 denied a taxpayer standing to con-
test the right of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to account
for its expenditures, solely on certification by its director.6 3 The
taxpayer alleged that without detailed information on CIA expend-
itures he could not properly follow legislative or executive action
and fulfill his obligations as a voter. The Supreme Court denied
the taxpayer's request.
Even a court's attempt to balance the concerns of national se-
curity with the public's legitimate interest in environmental pro-
tection and personal safety failed to escape FOIA exceptions. In
Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Pro-
ject, the United States Supreme Court overturned a court of ap-
peals order to the Navy that it prepare and release to the public a
"hypothetical Environmental Impact Statement" relative to the
construction of a new ammunition and weapons storage facility ca-
pable of storing nuclear weapons. 4 The basis for the Supreme
Court reversal was FOIA exemption number one that exempts
from disclosure classified material dealing with national security.
In some instances government information has been withheld
even where private property and personal health were at risk.6 5 In
United States v. Stanley, the Supreme Court considered experi-
ments designed to test the effects of lysergic acid diethylamide
61. Mink, 410 U.S. at 110.
62. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
63. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 175. But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (requiring a
regular statement and accounting of public funds).
64. 454 U.S. 139, 140-41 (1981).
65. Some examples are the testing of nerve gas in southern Utah, nuclear testing in
the Nevada desert, and nuclear waste storage in the state of Washington.
[Vol. 55
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(LSD).6 6 The federal government had treated thousands of its citi-
zens as though they were laboratory animals, dosing them with
LSD without their knowledge or consent. The Supreme Court held
that such secret action was acceptable, determining that the Con-
stitution does not provide victim-citizens with a remedy for the
atrocious injuries inflicted upon them by their own government.
In a variety of more subtle ways, the government attempts to
exclude, manipulate, and otherwise control information dissemi-
nated in this country and abroad. For example, in Snepp v. United
States, prior censorship of a public employee was upheld by the
Supreme Court. 67 In Meese v. Keene, the Supreme Court upheld
the government's labelling of three short docudramas filmed in
Canada as "political propaganda." 8 Fear as to lost profits and pro-
fessional reputation in showing films labeled as "political propa-
ganda" reduced their potential dissemination. Nonetheless, the Su-
preme Court determined "political propaganda" to be a neutral
phrase that does not burden speech.6 9
Government certification of domestic films as "educational,
scientific, and cultural" permits duty-free export.70 Commercially
marginal documentaries often require exemption from export
charges to make export economically feasible. Films that opposed
administrative points of view, such as Save the Planet, which fo-
cused on dangers of nuclear weapons, and In Our Own Backyard, a
negative report on nuclear energy, failed to receive certification. 71
Films that supported current administrative points of view, such
as Radiation . .. Naturally and To Catch a Cloud: A Thoughtful
Look at Acid Rain produced by Edison Electrical Institute, re-
ceived certification.72
Federal law gives the United States State Department enor-
mous discretion in granting and denying visas to foreign visitors.
This power has been used to keep a variety of people from entering
66. 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
67. 444 U.S. 507 (1980). Lifetime censorship agreements have been imposed on more
than 290,000 government employees. FREEDOM AT RISK: SECRECY, CENSORSHIP, AND REPRES-
SION IN THE 1980's (Richard 0. Curry ed., 1988).
68. 481 U.S. 465 (1987). The three films were: ACID FROM HEAVEN and ACID RAIN: RE-
QUIEM OR RECOVERY, each discussing industrial pollution, and IF You LOVE THIS PLANET, an
Academy Award-winning film on the dangers of nuclear war. Meese, 481 U.S. at 468 n.3.
69. Id. at 484-85.
70. See Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing the Bei-
rut Agreement under which qualifying audio-visual materials receive various benefits, in-
cluding exemption from import duties); see also ELIZABETH HULL, TAKING LIBERTIES 109-22
(1990) (also discussing the Beirut Agreement).
71. Bullfrog, 847 F.2d at 504, 509-10 n.11; see also HULL, supra note 70, at 112-14.
72. See Bullfrog, 847 F.2d at 509-10 n.11; HULL, supra note 70, at 113-14.
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the United States, solely because their political views were not ac-
ceptable to the administration.7" In Kleindienst v. Mandel, the Su-
preme Court held that although citizens have a First Amendment
right to receive information:
[W]hen the Executive exercises [the delegated power to exclude
aliens] ... on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide rea-
son, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that dis-
cretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First
Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication
with the applicant. 4
The other side of the same issue is equally troubling. The State
Department controls passports for ordinary United States citizens
who may want to find out for themselves what is going on abroad
only to be told that entire countries may not be visited, such as
Cuba, because of foreign policy considerations.7 5 Secrecy of govern-
mental affairs in the guise of protecting the public is paternalistic,
deceitful, and ultimately tyrannical.
Every attempt to censor is an attempt to kill an idea. Sometimes
the idea seems trivial in one age and vital in another .... Some-
times the censors speak for national security, sometimes for pub-
lic morals. But always they speak for fear. Fear that their oppo-
nents' ideas will persuade. Fear that their own arguments, values,
and beliefs will be found wanting. Fear that free people, left to
their own devices will fall into evil ways. Americans have come to
accept such fears, to readily grant exceptions to free speech. And
that is reason to be afraid.71
III. RIGHT TO KNOW IN THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION
A. History
Federal constitutional and statutory law defining openness in
government seems relatively fixed and unlikely to change dramati-
73. See generally HULL, supra note 70, at 13-52. Notable exclusions by visa denial
include: Canadian writer Farley Mowat, Nobel Prize-winning Columbian author Gabriel
Garcia Marguez, and former Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. HULL, supra note 70,
at 13. Tomas Borge, Nicaragua's interior minister, was denied a visa because he intended to
make speeches critical of President Reagan's Central American policy. HULL, supra note 70,
at 19. Olgay Finlay, an authority on family law, was denied a visa because her speaking
engagements would have allowed her to propagate Cuban policies. HULL, supra note 70, at
44 n.96.
74. 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).
75. See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
76. Virginia I. Postrel, Free Minds and Free Ma)rkets. Quiet Crusade: Seize a Church
School, Ban a Prayer Meeting, Close Down a Synagogue, Zealous Bureaucrats are Strug-
gling with Religious Liberty, REASON MAGAZINE Vol. 19, 20-26 (Dec. 1987).
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cally in the immediate future. However, rejection of a federal con-
stitutional right to know does not foreclose the possibility of indi-
vidual states providing citizens within their boundaries the right to
know. All fifty states have some form of statutory provision for
freedom of information. Montana, Louisiana, North Dakota, and
New Hampshire have explicit constitutional provisions.77 Most
state constitutions with right to know provisions include poten-
tially eviscerating exceptions: Louisiana excepts "cases established
by law"; North Dakota excepts anything "otherwise provided by
law"; and New Hampshire excepts any reasonable restriction. Only
Montana has stated a precise and narrowly drawn exception. 7 Ar-
ticle II, Section 9, of the Montana Constitution, reads:
Right to know. No person shall be deprived of the right to ex-
amine documents or to observe the deliberations of all public
bodies or agencies of state government and its subdivisions, ex-
77. States having no constitutional right-to-know/open meetings provisions: Alaska,
Arizona, Hawaii (however, having a statutory open meeting provision at HAw. REV. STAT.
§ 92-10 (1993)), Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Virginia, and West Virginia.
State constitutions guaranteeing open legislative sessions: IDAHO CONST. art. 3, § 12;
MONT. CONST. art. V, § 10 (The Montana guarantee of open legislative sessions and open
legislative committee meetings is in addition to the generalized guarantee of a public right
to know. Presumptively, the art. V, § 10 guarantee is absolute and could not be overcome
by a showing that the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeded the merits of public
disclosure.); N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 12; N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 14; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 14.
State constitutions with qualified guarantees of open legislative sessions:
(a) Except in circumstances requiring secrecy: ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 57; COLO. CONST.
art. V, § 14; CONN. CONST. art. III, § 16; DEL. CONST. art. II, § 11; IND. CONST. art. IV, § 13;
MD. CONST. art. III, § 21; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 20; MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 14; Miss.
CONST. art. IV, § 58; Mo. CONST. art. III, § 20; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 11; N.H. CONST. Part 2,
art. VIII; N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 10; OHIo CONST. art. II, § 13; S.C. CONST. art. III, § 23; S.D.
CONST. art. III, § 15; TENN. CONST. art. II, § 22; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 8; WASH. CONST. art. II,
§ 11; WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 10; WYo. CONST. art. III, § 14.
(b) Except when Senate meeting in executive session: NEv. CONST. art. IV, § 15; TEx.
CONST. art. III, § 16; UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 15.
(c) Except upon vote of members to close: CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 7(c); GA. CONST. art.
III, § 4, para. 11; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 5(c).
Miscellaneous state constitutional provisions: CAL. CONST. art. IX, para. 9(g) (meetings
of Board of Regents open except as provided by statute); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 11(d) (meet-
ings of Judicial Nominating Commission open except for deliberations of commission); and
MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (formal sessions of university governing boards open).
States having broad constitutional right-to-know/open meetings provisions: LA. CONST.
art. XII, § 3 (all meetings open "except in cases established by law"); MONT. CONST. art. II,
§ 9 (right to know and all meetings open "except in cases in which the demand of individual
privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure"); N.H. CONST. part I, art. 8 (right to
know "shall not be unreasonably restricted"); N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 5 (all meetings open
"[u]nless otherwise provided by law"). Brief of Plaintiffs and Respondents app. A, Associ-
ated Press v. Board of Pub. Educ., 246 Mont. 386, 804 P.2d 376 (1991) (No. 89-589).
78. A special thank you is extended to Constitutional Convention Delegate Dorothy
Eck for her introduction and support of the right-to-know provision.
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cept in cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly
exceeds the merits of public disclosure.
While state right to know constitutional provisions and state
freedom of information laws do not have any real impact on fed-
eral government secrecy, they could serve as experimental illustra-
tions of open government. State models of open government can
not address the problem of external security, and necessarily pro-
vide a limited experimental illustration.
In considering state government arrangements for public ac-
cess to government information, Montana seems to be an ideal
model. Montana is one of only four states that have explicit consti-
tutional right to know provisions. And Montana is the only state
that does not destroy the right with open-ended exceptions. The
only limitation placed on the Montana right to know is the right of
the individual to personal privacy. Wade J. Dahood, Chairman of
the Bill of Rights Committee of the Montana Constitutional Con-
vention, urged the convention to take note that "the guidelines
and protections for the exercise of liberty in a free society come
not from government but from the people who create that govern-
ment. ' '79 He added that it was in that spirit that the committee
attempted to insure "a more responsible government that is Con-
stitutionally commanded never to forget that government is cre-
ated solely for the welfare of the people."80
Substantial sentiment was present within the Constitutional
Convention to amend the "right to know" provision by deleting the
final phrase "except in cases in which the demand of individual
privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure" and substi-
tuting the phrase "except as may be provided by law in cases in
which the demands of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits
of public disclosure."'" The delegates selected the former wording
that implicitly favors judicial interpretation of general constitu-
tional language on a case specific basis over legislatively crafted
exceptions in response to special interest requests.8 2
Prior to the 1972 Constitutional Convention, Montana law in-
cluded a large number of statutes that pertained to the public's
right to know and limitations upon that right. 3 Probably the most
79. 2 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1971-1972, at 619 (1979).
80. Id.
81. 5 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1971-1972, at 1671-79 (1979) (empha-
sis added) (while the vote was relatively close, 56 to 30, the proposed amendment was de-
feated as the convention delegates favored the provision without any direction to the legisla-
ture that it should implement the provision).
82. Id.
83. For example, such diverse activities as bean dealer records, grade of commercial
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significant statutory right to know precursor to the constitutional
right to know was the Montana Open Meeting Act of 1963. The
legislature has amended the original act in an attempt to accom-
modate the Montana constitutional right to know language and
subsequent judicial interpretations. 4 Patterned somewhat after
the federal Freedom of Information Act, the act provides for the
fertilizer, bank reports, insurer notices of noncompliance, hard rock mining information,
records concerning air contaminant sources, information relating to occupational health,
water pollution information, welfare information records, and pre-sentence investigative re-
ports were previously afforded some degree of statutory confidentiality.
84. Section 2-3-201 of the Montana Code states:
The legislature finds and declares that public boards, commissions, councils, and
other public agencies in this state exist to aid in the conduct of the peoples' busi-
ness. It is the intent of this part that actions and deliberations of all public agen-
cies shall be conducted openly. The people of the state do not wish to abdicate
their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them. Toward these ends, the provi-
sions of the part shall be liberally construed.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-201 (1993).
The principal provision of this legislation, which both requires open meetings and pro-
vides certain exceptions, is MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-203 (1993). This section states that:
(1) All meetings of public or governmental bodies, boards, bureaus, commis-
sions, agencies of the state, or any political subdivision of the state or organiza-
tions or agencies supported in whole or in part by public funds or expending pub-
lic funds must be open to the public.
(2) All meetings of associations that are composed of public or governmental
bodies referred to in subsection (1) and that regulate the rights, duties, or privi-
leges of any individual must be open to the public.
(3) Provided, however, the presiding officer of any meeting may close the
meeting during the time the discussion relates to a matter of individual privacy
and then if and only if the presiding officer determines that the demands of indi-
vidual privacy clearly exceed the merits of public disclosure. The right of individ-
ual privacy may be waived by the individual about whom the discussion pertains
and, in that event, the meeting shall be open.
(4)(a) However, except as provided in subsection (4)(b), a meeting may be
closed to discuss a strategy to be followed with respect to litigation when an open
meeting would have a detrimental effect on the litigating position of the public
agency.
(b) A meeting may not be closed to discuss strategy to be followed in litiga-
tion in which the only parties are public bodies or associations described in sub-
sections (1) and (2).
(5) Any committee or subcommittee appointed by a public body or an associ-
ation described in subsection (2) for the purpose of conducting business which is
within the jurisdiction of that agency shall be subject to the requirements of this
section.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-203 (1993). As originally enacted, the law contained many excep-
tions that have been deleted since ratification of the 1972 Montana Constitution.
Another statute directly effecting the right to know is MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-6-102
(1993). That statute provides:
(1) Every citizen has a right to inspect and take a copy of any public writings
of this state, except as . . . expressly provided by statute.
(2) Every public officer having the custody of a public writing which a citizen
has a right to inspect is bound to give him on demand a certified copy of it. . ..
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-6-102 (1993).
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right to observe the deliberations of governmental bodies,8 5 prohib-
its exclusion of accredited press representatives from any open
meeting,86 and requires that minutes of meetings be open for in-
spection by the public."7 Notwithstanding the mandatory right to
know language of the Montana Constitution, many statutory provi-
sions remain that purport to restrict the public's general right to
know."
B. Case Interpretation of Montana's Right to Know
A growing body of Montana case law interprets the constitu-
tional right to know. The Montana Supreme Court has reviewed
some of the statutory restrictions and held them unconstitu-
tional.89 Several of the recent decisions have begun to develop a
more consistent approach to open government.9 "
On the other hand, many of the decisions have failed to give
due consideration to the historical justification for a right to know,
have failed to analyze the application of the law in a consistent
fashion, or have made perplexing policy choices. An analysis and
evaluation of all of the right to know decisions and supporting
opinions does not provide an articulable jurisprudential overview
of the meaning and purpose of a right to know. Predicting the out-
come of cases before they have been decided continues to be
difficult.
A number of potential ways exist in which to classify and ana-
lyze the decisions and opinions interpreting the right to know pro-
vision in the Montana Constitution. One way is to divide the cases
between those that seem to contract the right to know and those
85. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-203 (1993).
86. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-211 (1993).
87. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-212 (1993).
88. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-4144(3) (local government records); § 32-1-234
(bank and trust company reports); § 40-8-126 (adoption proceedings); § 41-3-205 (child
abuse and neglect proceedings); § 41-5-601 to -603 (Youth Court proceedings); §§ 44-5-214,
-301 to -303, -504, -515 (criminal justice information); §§ 50-16-203, -205 (medical reports
and health care information); § 50-20-110(5) (1993) (documentation of abortions).
The above-mentioned statutes do not purport to be a complete or comprehensive expla-
nation or even a complete listing of all relevant right-to-know statutes or exemptions from
the provision.
89. See, e.g., Great Falls Tribune Co. v. Great Falls Pub. Schs., 255 Mont. 125, 841
P.2d 502 (1992); Associated Press v. State, 250 Mont. 299, 820 P.2d 421 (1991); Associated
Press v. Board of Pub. Educ., 246 Mont. 386, 804 P.2d 376 (1991).
90. Bozeman Daily Chronicle v. Bozeman Police Dep't, - Mont. -, 859 P.2d 435
(1993); Allstate Ins. Co. v. City of Billings, 239 Mont. 321, 780 P.2d 186 (1989); see also
Great Falls Tribune Co. v. Great Falls Pub. Schs., 255 Mont. 125, 841 P.2d 502 (1992);
Associated Press v. Board of Pub. Educ., 246 Mont. 386, 804 P.2d 376 (1991). But see SJL
of Montana v. City of Billings, - Mont. - , P.2d -, 50 St. Rep. 1726 (1993).
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that tend to expand the right to know.9' A second way to classify
might be according to whether the information sought involves a
risk of invasion of the privacy of a group of persons or an individ-
ual.92 A third classification would divide the cases on the basis of
whether the right to know claim was based on some special partic-
91. Contracting: State v. Burns, 253 Mont. 37, 830 P.2d 1318 (1992); Flesh v. Board of
Trustees, 241 Mont. 158, 786 P.2d 4 (1990); Engrav v. Cragun, 236 Mont. 260, 769 P.2d 1224
(1989); State ex rel. Great Falls Tribune Co. v. District Court, 238 Mont. 310, 777 P.2d 345
(1989); Belth v. Bennett, 227 Mont. 341, 740 P.2d 638 (1987); Missoulian v. Board of Re-
gents, 207 Mont. 513, 675 P.2d 962 (1984); Montana Human Rights Div. v. City of Billings,
199 Mont. 434, 649 P.2d 1283 (1982); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Department of
Pub. Serv. Regulation, 194 Mont. 277, 634 P.2d 181 (1981).
Expanding: Montana Health Care Ass'n v. State Compensation Mut. Ins. Fund, 256
Mont. 146, 845 P.2d 113 (1993); Citizens to Recall Mayor Whitlock v. Whitlock, 255 Mont.
517, 844 P.2d 74 (1992); Great Falls Tribune Co. v. Great Falls Pub. Sch., 255 Mont. 125,
841 P.2d 502 (1992); PacifiCorp v. Department of Revenue, 254 Mont. 387, 838 P.2d 914
(1992); Associated Press v. State, 250 Mont. 299, 820 P.2d 421 (1991); Associated Press v.
Board of Pub. Educ., 246 Mont. 386, 804 P.2d 376 (1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. City of Bill-
ings, 239 Mont. 321, 780 P.2d 186 (1989); Great Falls Tribune Co. v. Cascade County Sher-
iff, 238 Mont. 103, 775 P.2d 1267 (1989); Jarussi v. Board of Trustees, 204 Mont. 131, 664
P.2d 316 (1983); Board of Trustees v. Board of County Comm'rs, 186 Mont. 148, 606 P.2d
1069 (1980).
92. Groups or corporations: Montana Health Care Ass'n v. State Compensation Mut.
Ins. Fund, 256 Mont. 146, 845 P.2d 113 (1993) (permitting public access to employee-em-
ployer information involving a large number of people and records); Great Falls Tribune Co.
v. Cascade County Sheriff, 238 Mont. 103, 775 P.2d 1267 (1989) (allowing public access to
information concerning four police officers who were suspended or terminated, while refus-
ing to protect the privacy of the individual public employee police officers); Engrav v.
Cragun, 236 Mont. 260, 769 P.2d 1224 (1989) (protecting the privacy rights of a large num-
ber of individuals and perhaps the privacy of the general operation of the sheriff's office
against the public's right to know); Belth v. Bennett, 227 Mont. 341, 740 P.2d 638 (1987)
(protecting the privacy of insurance companies licensed to conduct business in the state
against the public's right to know); Missoulian v. Board of Regents, 207 Mont. 513, 675 P.2d
962 (1984) (protecting the privacy of a small but identified group of public employees);
Montana Human Rights Div. v. City of Billings, 199 Mont. 434, 649 P.2d 1283 (1982) (re-
leasing personnel information about a large group of public employees without obtaining
prior consent stating that obtaining consent would be prohibitive without explaining
whether in terms or time or money; but requiring that the government agency must conceal
the identity of the individuals whose records were a part of the investigation); Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 194 Mont. 277, 634 P.2d 181
(1981) (providing privacy protection for a public utility against the public's right to know).
Individuals: Citizens to Recall Mayor Whitlock v. Whitlock, 255 Mont. 517, 844 P.2d 74
(1992) (declining to protect the privacy of an individual public employee); State v. Burns,
253 Mont. 37, 830 P.2d 1318 (1992) (denying government access to single individual's per-
sonnel files in the possession of private employer); Flesh v. Board of Trustees, 241 Mont.
158, 786 P.2d 4 (1990) (protecting the privacy of an individual public employee against the
public's right to know); Allstate Ins. Co. v. City of Billings, 239 Mont. 321, 780 P.2d 186
(1989) (permitting release of an individual's criminal justice records for the benefit of a
corporate defendant in a collateral civil action); State ex rel. Great Falls Tribune Co. v.
District Court, 238 Mont. 310, 777 P.2d 345 (1989) (protecting the individual privacy of a
single unidentified person); Jarussi v. Board of Trustees, 204 Mont. 131, 664 P.2d 316 (1983)
(nearly protecting the right of privacy of an individual public employee, but recognizing the
waiver of privacy by the individual and requiring the meeting in question to be opened).
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ularized need to know or on a general request for information held
by an agency of government."
The Montana Supreme Court seems to consider the estab-
lished position, power, and good name of the person, agency, insti-
tution, or corporation claiming privacy whenever a privacy claim is
asserted to block public access to information. For example, the
court denied privacy claims and permitted the release of informa-
tion regarding: a discredited mayor charged with sexual harass-
ment;"4 police officers reprimanded, disciplined, or discharged;"5
and an individual charged with a crime. 96 The court upheld privacy
claims and denied public access to information regarding: public
employees who were university presidents;9" corporations with val-
uable property or reputational interests at stake;9" and a police de-
partment with its public operation under scrutiny.9
Further, the Montana Supreme Court seems to consider the
power of the person or organization requesting the release of infor-
mation. In Engrav v. Cragun, the person requesting the informa-
tion was a student at Montana State University and the court de-
nied him access to police records, files, and information."' 0 In
Allstate Insurance Co. v. City of Billings, an insurance company
sought and obtained specific criminal justice information.101 How-
93. See Montana Health Care Ass'n v. State Compensation Mut. Ins. Fund, 256
Mont. at 150-52, 845 P.2d at 116-17 (holding that an employee challenging workers' com-
pensation right was entitled to employer-specific payroll information relied upon in setting
rates); PacifiCorp, 254 Mont. at 393-95, 838 P.2d at 918-19 (holding that a special tax audit
was available to the taxpayer); Burns, 253 Mont. at 40-43, 830 P.2d at 1320-22 (prosecution
needed the requested information to counter a criminal defendant's list of character wit-
nesses; an in-camera inspection of the requested files convinced the trial court judge that
the files were not necessary to the prosecution and that the individual's privacy clearly ex-
ceeded the merits of public disclosure); Allstate, 239 Mont. at 325, 780 P.2d at 188 (permit-
ting release of criminal justice records of the investigation of insured's death); Montana
Human Rights Div. v. City of Billings, 199 Mont. at 446-50, 649 P.2d at 1287-88 (permitting
the Human Rights Commission's request for specific information needed to investigate
claims of discrimination); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Serv.
Regulation, 194 Mont. at 287-89, 634 P.2d at 186-89 (the public service commission needed
specific information necessary to establish rates and the taxpaying public should have been
entitled to this information; however, the court upheld the corporation's request for secrecy
to protect its financial-property interest under the guise of a right of privacy).
94. Citizens to Recall Mayor Whitlock, 255 Mont. at 522-23, 844 P.2d at 77-78.
95. Great Falls Tribune Co. v. Cascade County Sheriff, 238 Mont. at 107, 775 P.2d at
1269.
96. Associated Press v. State, 250 Mont. at 302, 820 P.2d at 422.
97. Missoulian v. Board of Regents, 207 Mont. at 531-36, 675 P.2d at 972-74.
98. Belth, 227 Mont. at 345-49, 740 P.2d at 640-43; Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Department of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 194 Mont. at 287-89, 634 P.2d at 188-89.
99. Engrav, 236 Mont. at 267-68, 769 P.2d at 1229.
100. 236 Mont. 260, 769 P.2d 1224.
101. 239 Mont. 321, 780 P.2d 186.
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ever, Engrav and Allstate differed in additional ways. Allstate con-
cerned a specific need to know; whereas Engrav concerned the gen-
eralized right to know. Further, the requested information in
Allstate was easier to access and sanitize, the request being for in-
formation about one individual; whereas, the Engrav request was
for extensive departmental records.
C. Suggestions for Future Interpretations
Perhaps it is impossible to fairly and pragmatically respond to
all requests for public information in a consistent and logical fash-
ion. If it is possible to interpret the constitutional right to know
provision in a manner that is compatible with the language, his-
tory, and intent of the provision and consistent with the philo-
sophical justification for having a public right to know in a repre-
sentational democracy, a number of questions should be raised.
The first question is whether individual privacy is at risk, not
corporate privacy, not institutional privacy, and not government
enterprise privacy. If individual privacy is at risk, legitimate expec-
tations of privacy should be defined. Individual privacy is limited
by whatever one makes public. Individual privacy is limited to
what one subjectively seeks to maintain as private. Individual pri-
vacy is limited to that which society is prepared to recognize as
legitimate. 102 If the privacy claimed is that of a private individual
in a non-public activity, and if the privacy claimed is subjectively
expected and legitimately accepted, it must be weighed against the
public's right to know.
The business of government is not, in any case or under any
circumstance, a legitimate dimension of individual privacy. An in-
dividual working for and employed by the government necessarily
relinquishes a measure of privacy. The privacy relinquished is co-
terminous with the scope of the employment. In two recent deci-
sions, the Montana Supreme Court has taken an important first
step in this direction. In Great Falls Tribune Co. v. Great Falls
Public Schools, the court found the collective bargaining strategy
102. The various cases that elucidate the concept of "legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy" have primarily focused on criminal investigations. The test most frequently employed,
and to which reference is made in several of the Montana cases, is derived from the concur-
ring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Katz v. United States. "[T]here is a twofold require-
ment, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (involving FBI electronic listening and recording devices used to
obtain evidence of a crime). Outside of the application of criminal law, the demands of
individual privacy will usually be held to clearly exceed the merits of public disclosure when
a private individual seeks to shield private, non-criminal information.
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exception to the open meeting law unconstitutional. 0 3 In Associ-
ated Press v. Board of Public Education, the court found the stat-
utory litigation exception to the right to know unconstitutional.
0 4
These decisions were met with doom and foreboding by govern-
ment attorneys, public administrators, and unions. The tradition
of secret strategy in conducting the government's business is
deeply entrenched making it difficult for many government em-
ployees to imagine that the Montana Constitution means what it
says or that government business could possibly be conducted in
accordance with the public's right to know. Many have difficulty
perceiving that government business can be conducted openly or in
a manner different from the manner in which government business
has been conducted for centuries, that is, without allowing the
public to know what government is doing.
When, as in Associated Press v. Board of Public Education,0 5
a public agency is discussing litigation strategy in a lawsuit to be
asserted against another public agency, the necessity to close the
meeting and exclude the public is obviously unconstitutional and
patently absurd. The statute found to be unconstitutional in Asso-
ciated Press v. Board of Public Education stated that "a meeting
may be closed to discuss a strategy to be followed with respect to
collective bargaining or litigation when an open meeting would
have a detrimental effect on the bargaining or litigating position of
the public agency."10 Nothing in the statute mentioned the consti-
tutional justification for an exception to the public's right to know.
Article II, section 9, of the Montana Constitution specifically al-
lows only one exception: "cases in which the demand of individual
privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure."'0 7 Excep-
tions based on the speculative detrimental effect on the bargaining
or litigating position of a public agency are plainly not compatible
103. 255 Mont. 125, 131, 841 P.2d 502, 505 (1992); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-
203(4) (1991) (amended 1993). The 1993 legislature responded to the decision by eliminating
the exception for collective bargaining strategy sessions. '
104. 246 Mont. 386, 392, 804 P.2d 376, 379-380 (1991); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-
3-203(4) (1991) (amended 1993). Reading the decision as narrowly as possible, the 1993 Leg-
islature eliminated the exception for litigation strategy sessions only insofar as all parties to
the litigation are public agencies. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-203(4)(b) (1993). Otherwise,
the statute as amended in 1993 states: "a meeting may be closed to discuss a [litigation]
strategy... when an open meeting would have a detrimental effect on the litigating position
of the public agency." MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-203(4)(a) (1993). The above-quoted language
is a statutory attempt to modify the language of Montana's constitutional right-to-know
provision.
105. 246 Mont. 386, 804 P.2d 376.
106. Associated Press, 246 Mont. at 390, 804 P.2d at 378 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-
3-203(4) (1991) (amended 1993)).
107. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9.
[Vol. 55
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with the language or intent of the constitutional provision.
Litigation and collective bargaining strategies involving parties
who are not agencies of government will have to be considered sep-
arately. To maintain a level playing field it may be essential to
advise private individuals or groups that find themselves in a dis-
pute with a government agency that different rules apply as to liti-
gation or collective bargaining strategy than might otherwise apply
if a government agency were not involved.
If a private person asserts a claim of privacy, the court must
weigh the claim against the public's right to know, and in most
circumstances, the privacy claim will prevail. If a government
agency asserts a vicarious claim of privacy, the agency should be
required to notify any individual at risk, advising the individual of
the request for information and allowing waiver or objection. If the
individual waives the right of privacy, the information should be
released. If the individual objects to the release of information, the
court should weigh the privacy claim against the public's right to
know. If notification is not possible, for example, if the individual
cannot be located or the number of individuals involved would
make notification pragmatically impossible, the trial court should
not defer to the agency's vicarious assertion of privacy but should
make an independent decision. The court should make an initial
in-camera inspection of the requested information and determine
whether the right of privacy clearly exceeds the public's right to
know. If the court's initial decision is that the right of privacy
clearly exceeds the right to know, the court should take a second
action. The court should provide maximum access to the informa-
tion while protecting the individual's right to privacy.10 8 The court
should confer with the persons requesting the information and en-
108. In Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Department of Public Service
Regulation, the court issued a protective order that supposedly gave the Public Service
Commission access to information needed to perform its regulatory duties. Information was
also made available to other parties participating in the rate hearings subject to provisions
protecting the confidentiality of the Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company's
trade secret information. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 194 Mont. at 290-93, 634 P.2d at
190-92. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. City of Billings, the court ordered the district court to
conduct an in-camera inspection of the documents at issue to determine what material could
be released. The court further suggested that the district court could limit the release of
information by a protective order, but did not specify the terms of the protective order.
Allstate Ins. Co., 239 Mont. at 326, 780 P.2d at 189. In Montana Health Care Association v.
State Compensation Mutual Insurance Fund, the court held that employees' and employ-
ers' rights to withhold specific payroll information did not clearly exceed the merits of pub-
lic disclosure. In ordering the release of the information held by the State Compensation
Mutual Insurance Fund, the court stated without detailing the specifics that a protective
order could be fashioned to protect individual privacy and at the same time disclose the
needed information. Montana Health Care Ass'n, 256 Mont. at 152, 845 P.2d at 117.
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courage them to propose arrangements that would permit the re-
lease of the information while protecting legitimate claims of pri-
vacy. The concern, commitment, and ingenuity of the requesting
parties could be determinative of whether the information should
be released.
What would be the outcome in the several cases discussed if
the proposed analysis and suggested policy choices controlled the
decisions and opinions of the court? All cases involving the public
aspect of public employees' activities are easy to resolve. The pub-
lic has a right to know. 09
Cases that involve corporations are equally easy to decide. In
the debates of the 1972 Constitutional Convention, the delegates
clearly intended the right of privacy to be available to individuals
only. 110 Corporate individual privacy is an oxymoron, a contradic-
tion in terms. Public utility corporations and to a lesser extent,
such heavily regulated corporations as insurance companies, are
without a scintilla of justification to support a claim of individual
privacy. An insurance company is subject to extensive state regula-
tion and must submit information to the state Commissioner of
Insurance for evaluation of its financial stability as a means of pro-
tecting consumers. Withholding such information from the public
is nothing short of incredible."' A public utility's request for in-
creased rates is a public dimension of its corporate operation." 2
109. See, e.g., Citizens to Recall Mayor Whitlock, 255 Mont. 517, 844 P.2d 74; Great
Falls Tribune Co. v. Great Falls Pub. Sch., 255 Mont. 125, 841 P.2d 502; Associated Press v.
Board of Pub. Educ., 246 Mont. 386, 804 P.2d 376; Flesh, 241 Mont. 158, 786 P.2d 4; Great
Falls Tribune Co. v. Cascade County Sheriff, 238 Mont. 103, 775 P.2d 1267; Missoulian v.
Board of Regents, 207 Mont. 513, 675 P.2d 962; Jarussi, 204 Mont. 131, 664 P.2d 316.
110. Answering a question concerning the privacy of a corporation, a member of the
Bill of Rights committee responded that a corporation would not be considered to be an
individual. See 5 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1971-1972, at 1680 (1981).
111. The information requested in Belth was compiled at taxpayer expense and then
denied to the public to protect the individual privacy of the insurance companies that sell
insurance to citizens of the state of Montana (the taxpayers). 227 Mont. at 354, 740 P.2d at
646 (Sheehy, J., dissenting). As noted by Justice Sheehy, "It approaches inanity to hold that
Montana insureds shall not be allowed to know which troubled companies are doing busi-
ness in Montana or that they are troubled companies." Id.
112. In Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., the court held that "the de-
mands of individual privacy of a corporation as well as of a person might clearly exceed the
merits of public disclosure, and thus come within the exception of the right to know provi-
sion." Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 194 Mont. at 287, 634 P.2d at 188. The court fur-
ther held that trade secret information was technically private property entitled to constitu-
tional protection and that a denial to issue the protective order had the effect of violating
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the
Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, and the Constitution of the state of Montana.
Id. at 283, 634 P.2d at 185. The court required Mountain States to furnish the commission
and the consumer council with information necessary for regulation, subject to a protective
order. The court did not require disclosure to the general public, claiming that such disclo-
[Vol. 55
24
Montana Law Review, Vol. 55 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/6
1994] GOVERNMENT CENSORSHIP & SECRECY 199
Publicly regulated industries, such as public utilities, are not typi-
cal corporations. They are state regulated monopolistic enterprises
that are given special support and are expressly controlled by gov-
ernment. There can be no reasonable expectation of privacy by a
regulated industry regarding information necessary to determine
rate increases. Further, the activities of the agencies charged with
regulating public utilities are precisely the activities the citizenry
should be allowed to observe. The kind of information generated
by public utility commissions is information which should be made
available to the public. Too often, commissions formed to regulate
industries become subservient to the industry they regulate and
the so-called public representative in the form of a consumer coun-
sel becomes subservient to both the commission and the industry.
The necessity for public observation of regulated industries and
regulating agencies is obvious and should not be restricted.
More difficult cases involve the potential invasion of individ-
ual privacy of a large number of persons where the names of per-
sons and information about each has been accumulated by an
agency of government and the government agency in possession of
the information has asserted vicariously, the theoretical' 1 3 right of
privacy of unidentified and unnotified individuals." 4 In Montana
Human Rights Division v. City of Billings, the court considered
the need to know critical." 5 Without the information requested,
including identification detail associated with the information, the
Human Rights Commission could not carry out its legal responsi-
bility to investigate and prosecute discrimination." 6 In Engrav v.
Cragun, the court said that no identified or particularized need to
access the information existed." 7 The requesting party was a pri-
vate researcher, not a state agency. Nonetheless, public knowledge
about government operations in general and the need to know if
sure of trade secrets would deprive the telephone company of property without due process
of law. Id. at 286, 634 P.2d at 187. While the decision is bothersome, the real problem is that
the court opinion ignores the obvious intent of the framers of the constitution and the plain
language of the constitution, by declaring that a corporation has a constitutional right of
individual privacy.
113. Theoretical is used because the agency asserting the constitutional claim of pri-
vacy has no legitimate claim of personal privacy. The government agents are alleging the
privacy of others who have not been identified or notified and who have not been given the
opportunity to waive any claim of privacy they might have.
114. See, e.g., Engrav, 236 Mont. 260, 769 P.2d 1224; Montana Human Rights Div. v.
Billings, 199 Mont. 434, 649 P.2d 1283 (1982).
115. 199 Mont. 434, 649 P.2d 1283.
116. It should be noted that the requested information was public employees' employ-
ment records.
117. 236 Mont. at 267-68, 769 P.2d at 1228-29.
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agents of government have violated statutory or constitutional
rights should be considered matters of utmost importance.
Whether the request for information comes from a private citizen
or an agency of government should not affect the court's decision.
If the court must give any consideration as to who is making the
request for information, the court should show heightened concern
for the private request. The private party ordinarily has less power
and fewer alternative means by which to obtain the requested in-
formation. In such cases the court should never summarily deny
the public's right to know based on a public agency's vicarious pri-
vacy assertion. If the court assumes that notification is not possible
because of the large number of individuals whose privacy might be
at risk, the court should decide if the individual privacy at stake is
substantially more important than the public's right to know. No
deference should be given to the separate conclusion of the govern-
ment agency in possession of the information. Also, no basis exists
for the court to refer to a security interest and determine that the
protection of an undefined security risk is a compelling state inter-
est. Even a compelling government interest is not a basis for deny-
ing public access to government-held information.11 Again, if the
court's initial decision is that the right of privacy clearly exceeds
the right to know, the court should attempt to design a method to
provide maximum access to the information while protecting the
right to privacy.
The court, in State ex rel. Smith v. District Court, recom-
mended such an action:
Based upon the Right to Know provision of the Montana Consti-
tution and the right of access recognized under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, we
hold that the public and press may be excluded from a pretrial
suppression hearing only if dissemination of information acquired
at the hearing would create a clear and present danger to the fair-
ness of defendant's trial and no reasonable alternative means can
be utilized to avoid the prejudicial effect of such information.' 9
The court continued by noting that "[i]f the evidence adduced
supports a finding that there is a clear and present danger to trial
fairness, the court should then hear evidence and argument as to
whether less restrictive alternatives would suffice to ensure a fair
trial." 2 0
118. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9.
119. 201 Mont. 376, 385, 654 P.2d 982, 987 (1982).
120. State ex rel. Smith, 201 Mont. at 386, 654 P.2d at 988.
[Vol. 55
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The court in Smith was concerned not only about privacy but
the right to a fair trial. No less should be demanded of the court in
protecting the public's right to know when raised in other contexts.
The court should design the best arrangement possible to protect
individual privacy while accommodating the public's right to know.
For example, the court might issue protective orders, as in Mon-
tana Human Rights'2 ' and Mountain States Telephone and Tele-
graph.22 Other possibilities include release of information to the
extent the person requesting information obtains waivers from in-
dividuals whose privacy is at risk. If cost is a limiting factor in
giving notification, the requesting party might be required to pay
the cost. Requests for generalized information, in which identity
needs to be protected, could be accommodated by blanking out
names. In Missoulian v. Board of Regents, the court discussed al-
ternative means that might be used to open the meetings while
protecting individual privacy.'23 These included "protecting the
identity of those discussed, 'agenda scheduling'. . . , and objections
and side bar conferences."' 24 However, the court found these alter-
natives to be impractical and inadequate to protect privacy, con-
cluding that "closure of the job performance evaluations was nec-
essary to protect the individual privacy of the university presidents
and other university personnel.' 2 5
A final group of cases that pose unique problems are cases in-
volving criminal information.' Although the legislature has re-
sponded to the problem of collecting and disseminating criminal
justice information, the statutory response, while comprehensive, is
not without constitutional defect. The need to protect individual
privacy is greatest in criminal law cases because of the irreparable
damage caused by false charges and the constitutional requirement
of fair trial. On the other hand, the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article II, Section 24 of the Mon-
tana Constitution require public trials. The right of access to crim-
inal trials, i.e., the Sixth Amendment right to public trial,-is essen-
121. 199 Mont. 434, 649 P.2d 1283.
122. 194 Mont. 277, 634 P.2d 181.
123. 207 Mont. 513, 675 P.2d 962.
124. Missoulian v. Board of Regents, 207 Mont. at 533, 675 P.2d at 973.
125. Id. at 535, 675 P.2d at 974. As public employees being evaluated as to a public
aspect of their public employment, the answer should have been easy. The meetings should
have been open to the public because the public interest clearly outweighs the individuals'
privacy interests.
126. See Associated Press v. State, 250 Mont. 299, 820 P.2d 421; Allstate, 239 Mont.
321, 780 P.2d 186; State ex rel. Great Falls Tribune Co. v. District Court, 238 Mont. 310,
777 P.2d 345; Great Falls Tribune Co. v. Cascade County Sheriff, 238 Mont. 103, 775 P.2d
1267; State ex rel. Smith, 201 Mont. 376, 654 P.2d 982.
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tially a subset of the broader right to know principle.
In the area of criminal law, the court is required to consider
federal constitutional requirements, such as fair trial, even though
such requirements are not mentioned as part of the exception
stated in Montana's right to know provision. In State ex rel. Smith
v. District Court, the Montana Supreme Court followed the sug-
gested approach.127 First, the court considered both federal and
state constitutional demands for fair trial as a limitation on the
right to know. 28 The court emphasized the importance of public
trials. 2 ' In the Smith opinion, which addressed the propriety of
closing a suppression hearing, the court weighed the right of fair
trial and privacy against the right to a public trial. The opinion
concluded that the trial court should "consider the efficacy of en-
tering . . . protective order[s]" that would eliminate material that
might impinge on a fair trial. 130
Occasionally, court analysis seems to skirt issues of fair trial
and privacy, treating traditional criminal justice procedures as sac-
rosanct. In Associated Press v. State the Montana Supreme Court
gave minimal concern to individual privacy or fair trial, holding
that Section 46-11-701(6) of the Montana Code was unconstitu-
tional.' The challenged statute provided: ". . . [a]n affidavit filed
in support of a motion for leave to file a charge or warrant must be
sealed unless the judge determines that disclosure of the informa-
127. 201 Mont. 376, 654 P.2d 982.
128. Smith, 201 Mont. at 380-85, 654 P.2d at 985-87. The right-to-know provision
makes no exception for fair trial. This would seem to indicate an intent on the part of the
constitutional convention delegates to accord the "public right to know" a superior position
in the hierarchy of rights. The right to know is subject to a single stated limitation-the
right to individual privacy. However, a fair trial is not only required by the Montana Consti-
tution, but also by the United States Constitution. The minimum demands of federal con-
stitutional fair trial must be observed regardless of the language or interpretation of the
Montana Constitution.
129. In Smith, the court cited Great Falls Tribune v. District Court as holding that "a
trial court cannot restrict the right of any person to observe such (criminal] proceedings
unless exclusion of the public be a 'strict and irreparable necessity to ensure defendant's
right to a fair trial.' " Smith, 201 Mont. at 381, 654 P.2d at 985 (quoting Great Falls Tribune
v. District Court, 186 Mont. 433, 441, 608 P.2d 116, 121 (1980)). Additionally, the court in
Smith cited Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court:
"[U]nder the First and Fourteenth Amendments 'the press and general public have a consti-
tutional right of access to criminal trials, . . . the denial [of which must be] necessitated by
a compelling governmental interest, and [be] narrowly tailored to serve that interest.' " 201
Mont. at 382, 654 P.2d at 986 (quoting from Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457
U.S. 596, 603 (1982) (referring to Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555
(1980))) (brackets original).
130. 201 Mont. at 386-87, 654 P.2d at 988. Similarly, individual privacy could often be
protected by eliminating material rather than by closing meetings or refusing to release any
information.
131. 250 Mont. 299, 303, 820 P.2d 421, 423 (1991).
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tion in the affidavit is required to protect the health, safety, or wel-
fare of the public. 1 32 Individual privacy was at risk; neither a cor-
poration nor public employees were involved. The court should
have decided whether the demands of individual privacy clearly
exceeded the merits of public disclosure, but failed to do so. The
court stated that the legislature gave no indication of having "...
considered whether, individual privacy requires that the affidavits.
. must be sealed"'' 3 and concluded that because the statute failed
to consider privacy, it was unconstitutional. If the court had
weighed the demands of individual privacy against the merits of
public disclosure, privacy should have prevailed and the statute
held to be constitutional. 34
The primary support for the conclusion reached by the court
in Associated Press v. State was that the statute was a "reversal of
a long-standing policy of allowing public access to such affida-
vits."' 6 The court made the unsupported statement that release of
the affidavits created the perception of fairness and helped the ac-
cused to defend himself. '36 The statute is inherently a protective
order in that it does not conceal the information indefinitely. The
public's "need" to know could be satisfied by reporting only the
132. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-701(6) (1991) (repealed 1993). Affidavits in support of
motions for warrants or leave to file charges are statements made by police and prosecutors
listing accumulated evidence that is believed to show probable cause to believe either that
incriminating evidence of a specified kind will be found at a designated location or a listing
of accumulated evidence that is believed to show probable cause to believe a named person
has committed a specified crime. This information is not subject to any opposing statement
by the accused, is not subject to any examination or right of refutation by the accused, and
is offered prior to proof of guilt before a judge or a jury. By its very nature, the release of
such information is an enormous invasion of individual privacy.
133. Associated Press v. State, 250 Mont. at 302, 820 P.2d at 423.
134. Perhaps the decision of the court was well taken, solely on the ground that the
stated legislative justification for disclosure of the information in the affidavits was " 'to
protect the health, safety, or welfare of the public.' " Id. at 302, 820 P.2d at 423. As the
opinion states, "[this standard] . . . is in fact the antithesis of the standard required under
the Montana Constitution." Id. The precise meaning of this statement is difficult to ascer-
tain; however, the court has, in a slightly different context, relied on the need to protect
personal security to justify closing a public hearing. See State ex rel. Great Falls Tribune
Co. v. District Court, 238 Mont. 310, 777 P.2d 345 (1989) (determining that protection from
physical harm arising from participation in the criminal proceeding created a subjective ex-
pectation of privacy that a reasonable person would recognize).
135. Associated Press v. State, 250 Mont. at 302, 820 P.2d at 423.
136. Id. at 303, 820 P.2d at 423. Both conclusions are contradicted by the pragmatics
of what affidavits in support of motions for warrants and leave to file charges accomplish.
Right to counsel, confrontation, and notice are significant examples of requirements that
help the accused. Affidavits provide notice, and, to that extent, help the accused. Making
the notice public is of no help to the accused. Releasing unsubstantiated, uncontested, often
speculative, accusatorial information neither helps the accused nor creates the perception of
fairness.
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fact of arrest and the charge. The details would be made known in
the course of a public trial, unless dismissed as insupportable,
thereby avoiding an inappropriate invasion of privacy.
In at least one instance in the criminal law arena, the court
created an additional exception to the right to know. The addi-
tional exception is personal security classified as a subset of pri-
vacy. In State ex rel. Great Falls Tribune Co. v. District Court,
the court directed the attorneys to brief the case on the assump-
tion that closing the hearing protected an unidentified person from
harm.' 37 After considering the briefs, the court concluded that clo-
sure of the hearing was proper. The court considered the risk of
physical harm as a subset of the right to privacy, concluding that
privacy expectations are most reasonable when release of the infor-
mation might lead to physical harm.'3 8 Consideration of personal
security as a limit on the public's right to know could close many
hearings.139 The court did not divulge enough facts to allow an in-
dependent evaluation of whether individual privacy exceeded the
merits of public disclosure, and the court did not attempt to fash-
ion a protective order to limit possible harm.
Engrav v. Cragun is an example of the court's solicitude for
the protection of agency activity and impatience with a powerless
but curious researcher.' 0 In Engrav, the court should have
weighed the right to know against the right of individual privacy in
the first instance. If the demand of individual privacy clearly ex-
ceeded the merits of public disclosure, the information requested
should have been made available subject to a protective order,
such as the deletion of names or notification to named individuals
and requests for waivers. The court failed to do either. Rather than
analyzing the request in constitutional terms as required by law,
the court relied on a compelling state interest test and the statute,
not considering whether the statutory language was
constitutional.141
137. 238 Mont. at 317, 777 P.2d at 349.
138. State ex rel. Great Falls Tribune v. District Court, 238 Mont. at 318-19, 777 P.2d
at 350.
139. Personal security is not mentioned as a limit on the Montana constitutional right
to know. If personal security were to justify closure of criminal proceedings, many would be
closed. Victims, witnesses, and even defendants are often at risk by the facts that are
presented in criminal court proceedings.
140. 236 Mont. 260, 769 P.2d 1224.
141. The court said that before it would:
invade the individual privacy of the persons involved, a compelling state interest
to do so must be found. There is no compelling state interest here which allows
the dissemination of the requested information. Appellant wishes to do a study for
a school research project; this is not a sufficient state interest.
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In some cases, the court seems to forget completely that the
privacy claim is made by a public employee and that the requested
information concerns activities within the scope of that public em-
ployment. In Great Falls Tribune Co. v. Cascade County Sheriff,
the court weighed the expectation of privacy of law enforcement
officers against the merits of public disclosure and supported the
trial court order directing disclosure of the identity of officers sub-
jected to internal discipline. 2 The discipline occurred relative to
and within the scope of their employment. The court, however, de-
termined that individual privacy was at risk, and weighed privacy
against the public's right to know, concluding that "it is not good
public policy to recognize an expectation of privacy in protecting
the identity of a law enforcement officer whose conduct is suffi-
ciently reprehensible to merit discipline."""3
In two notable criminal justice information cases, the court
conducted a careful analysis, balancing the right of individual pri-
vacy against the public's right to know and suggested use of pro-
tective orders if needed and to the extent possible. First, in All-
state Insurance Co. v. City of Billings, the court evaluated the
request for information as this article suggests."' The plaintiff in-
surance company sought criminal justice records relating to its in-
sured. The court determined that a privacy right existed, weighed
the right of individual privacy against the merits of public disclo-
sure, and ordered the trial court to hold an in-camera inspection of
the requested documents, stating:
In making this examination, the court shall take into account and
shall balance the competing interests of those involved.
Allstate should be accorded the widest breadth of informa-
tion possible. However, its request should be reviewed with defer-
Engrav, 236 Mont. at 267, 769 P.2d at 1229. Relying on the language of section 44-5-303 of
the Montana Code, the court said that "dissemination of confidential criminal justice infor-
mation is restricted to criminal justice agencies or to those authorized by law to receive it.
Appellant is neither part of a criminal justice agency nor authorized to receive the informa-
tion." Id. The court applied the statute to the facts before the court without questioning the
constitutionality of the statute.
By contrast, in Allstate Insurance Co. v. City of Billings the court stated:
The legislature does not have the power to provide through the passage of statute
who can exercise this right [to know] unless it finds that such curtailment is nec-
essary to protect the right of individual privacy . . . . [Any interpretation of
§ 44-5-303, MCA, which requires specific legislative authorization to review crimi-
nal justice information would render the statute unconstitutional.
239 Mont. 321, 325, 780 P.2d 186, 189 (1989).
142. 238 Mont. 103, 107, 775 P.2d 1267, 1269 (1989).
143. Great Falls Tribune Co. v. Cascade County Sheriff, 238 Mont. at 107, 775 P.2d at
1269 (quoting the trial court's decision).
144. 239 Mont. 321, 780 P.2d 186.
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ence towards the privacy rights of those named in the police
records. Any release of information, of course, can be conditioned
upon limits contained within a protective order.14
The court's commendable analysis in Allstate was followed in
Bozeman Daily Chronicle v. Bozeman Police Department to reach
a similar conclusion. 146
A startling recent Montana decision on the right to know ap-
parently has overruled, sub silentio, both Great Falls Tribune v.
Great Falls Public Schools and Associated Press v. Board of Edu-
cation. In SJL of Montana Associates v. City of Billings, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court held that the constitutional right to know
does not include actions or deliberations of employees, agents, or
members of a public agency when negotiating with other public of-
ficials and private persons doing business with the government. 14
7
In addition to narrowing the right to know, the decision relied on
selective language from the constitutional convention debates to
interpret article II, Section 9.148 In previous cases 149 the court had
held that the language of article II, Section 9 "speaks for itself'
and the intent of the delegates to the convention should be inter-
preted from the plain language of the constitution. 150 The majority
made no public policy argument. Nothing suggests that this re-
strictive reading of article II, Section 9 better serves the public in-
terest. If government is so inclined, it may now shield most govern-
ment actions from direct public scrutiny. Generalized directions
could be given by government boards and government agencies to
individual members and employees who in turn can work out all
the details, do all the negotiations, make most deliberations, and
all but formalize most actions, in private.
Analyzing and evaluating Montana's endeavor to implement
and interpret a constitutional right to know may not provide much
insight into the overall problem of government secrecy. Montana is
a peculiar state with a small population. The Montana experiment
in open government is nonetheless interesting and the lessons
learned should be carefully considered. 15 1
145. Allstate, 239 Mont. at 326, 780 P.2d at 189.
146. Bozeman Daily Chronicle v. Bozeman Police Dep't, - Mont. - 859 P.2d
435 (1993).
147. SJL of Montana v. City of Billings, - Mont. -, P.2d - , 50 St. Rep.
1726 (1993).
148. Id. at ., P.2d - , 50 St. Rep. at 1728-29.
149. Great Falls Tribune v. Great Falls Pub. Schs., 255 Mont. 125, 841 P.2d 502 and
Associated Press v. Board of Education, 246 Mont. 386, 804 P.2d 376.
150. Associated Press v. Board of Education, 246 Mont. at 389, 804 P.2d at 379.
151. The Montana experiment in open government is not a perfect illustration of what
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Amid growing federal government paranoia and increasing
federal government secrecy, it is unlikely a right to know will be
found in emanations from the penumbras of the United States
Constitution's Bill of Rights, nor in the Ninth Amendment, nor
from any central principle of constitutional democracy. An increas-
ing awareness that information is the real power source is not
likely to lead to greater openness in government.
IV. CONCLUSION
The world is no longer run by weapons, energy, or money. It is
run by ones and zeroes, little bits of data. The question is not
about who has the most bullets, it is about who controls the infor-
mation. Real power comes from control of what we see and hear,
what we think, and how we work. That information is increasingly
held in the hands of government, local, state, and federal. And,
much of it is non-accessible to ordinary citizens.
The two legal propositions that dominate the constitutional
dimension of the struggle are "individual privacy" and the "right
to know." Individual privacy and the public's right to know are not
mutually exclusive. In most cases they are not in conflict. Individ-
ual privacy is not threatened by the public's right to know what
government is doing. Individual privacy is being lost in a fear-
driven scramble to install a security state. The public now tolerates
government activities clearly described in George Orwell's novel,
1984.15 ' In Florida u. Riley, 53 Justice Brennan remonstrated his
colleagues, urging them to recall the frightening parallel between
the action of government agents in Riley, aerial surveillance of a
private residence, and the action of government agents as de-
scribed forty years ago in Orwell's dread vision of life in the 1980s:
'The black-mustachio'd face gazed down from every commanding
corner. There was one on the house front immediately opposite.
BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, the caption said .... In
the far distance a helicopter skimmed down between the roofs,
hovered for an instant like a bluebottle, and darted away again
with a curving flight. It was the Police Patrol, snooping into peo-
ple's windows."654
might be accomplished. The constitutional right to know is too often sacrificed to corporate
claims and the false assertions of government agencies pleading vicarious privacy.
152. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
153. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
154. Riley, 488 U.S. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting GEORGE ORWELL, 1984
(1949)).
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A strange anomaly occurs. While individual privacy shrivels, gov-
ernment secrecy blossoms.
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